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in the upper grades, and the other was composed of approximately 200 children in the special classes. The diagnostic value of the tests was the difference in the percentages of the two groups passing the tests. Some tests with high diagnostic value were: Subtraction tests, 74 per cent.; comprehending difficult questions, 71 per cent.; reconstructing dissected sentences, 71 per cent.; and Healy cross-line tests, 64 per cent. Two of low value were: Interpreting pictures, 6 per cent., and describing pictures, — 2 per cent. The results of this experiment were compared with those of similar investigations. Some suggestions for future work with tests are given. Both studies show versatility in grouping results for bringing out the effects of different factors.

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Studies in Animal Behavior. S. J. HOLMES. Boston: Richard Badger. 1916. Pp. 266.

Professor Holmes has brought together the results of numerous studies. The essays are distinct, but together give a fairly connected account of our knowledge of animal behavior. The topics range from "The Instinct of Parental Care" to "The Mind of a Monkey," with accounts of such special subjects as tropisms, the death-feigning instinct, and recognition of sex.

Of particular interest to the psychologist and philosopher is his attitude to the continuity of evolution in behavior. In this he tends to retain the distinction made by Loeb between the simpler and higher forms. The lowest animals are explained by tropisms modified by special conditions while the higher require the assumption of association and the presence of ideas. He admits that earlier influences modify the responses of the simplest organisms, but insists that this is entirely different in its mechanism from the learning of the higher animals. How they are distinguished he does not say, but he says there is no sign of real learning in the protozoa. One may well question whether Holmes would find it easy to formulate in objective terms what the difference is, and a reference to the presence of ideas or even to the presence of a nervous system in one case and not in the other does not seem to be wholly sufficient.

In discussing the relation of pleasantness and unpleasantness to the learning process, Holmes criticizes Thorndike's explanation in terms of the behavior of neurones on the assumption that permeability of the synapses would depend in the last analysis upon the intensity of stimuli and that intensity and pleasantness are not closely correlated. Rather is pleasure correlated with quality or with the

activity of certain neurones or paths. Holmes favors a modification of the Hobhouse theory, asserts that repetition of pleasant acts depends upon the mutual reinforcement of congruous responses, and the mutual inhibition of incongruous. The pecking at unpleasant caterpillars by the chick is inhibited and so not learned because the sight-pecking reflex and the unpleasant-rejecting impulse mutually nullify each other, while the sight-pecking and pleasant-swallowing reflex reinforce each other. Whatever the final outcome, this view enables one to avoid treating feeling as a causal force and at least suggests a possible mechanism or physiological analogy for feeling that might be effective in learning.

In the same connection one may also mention Holmes's contention in the chapter on trial and error that this form of learning also presupposes a capacity for selection, an ability to know the right response when it appears, and this must be regarded as an instinct whether it be due to the presence of pleasure or to the congruity of responses. It can not be a property of unmodified protoplasm.

The more biological chapters on the influence of behavior on form and the behavior of cells are also to be recommended to the general student as non-technical summaries of much interesting work that is not readily available elsewhere.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, October, 1917. *La logique phénoménale* (pp. 297-324): P. DUPONT.—The postulates and principles of logic do not possess the certainty that characterizes the immediately given; they are not given by a rational intuition, although they arise in experience and are confirmed by reflection on experience and induction. *Le rôle des tendances affectives dans l'attention et dans la conscience* (pp. 325-344): E. RIGNANO.—Every state of attention is formed by an affective contrast which arises because an affective process called forth through a distance receptor arouses an antagonistic affective process. No psychical state is in itself either conscious or unconscious; it becomes one or the other by its connection with some other psychical state. Consciousness is not an intrinsic property of psychical states, but is extrinsic and relative to them. *L'acte symbolique* (pp. 345-361): EMILE BRÉHIER.—Symbolism presents two aspects: on the one hand, symbolism passes from act to intention, disengaging exterior conditions in order that we may constitute an interior life; on the other hand, there is a sym-